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Boston University Graduate School
Thesis

The Ethical Aspect of Final Causes submitted by


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In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of

of

Master of Arts
1913

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## Outline of Argument.

## 1. Introduction.

Statement of the Issue.

Our problem is the apparent antinomy between causality as the universal law of nature, and freedom of the will, as the basis of ethical life.

Statement of the Solution.

The contradiction is due to a misconception of the true implication of the terms causation and freedom; and to the narrowness of our metaphysics, or our interpretation of life as a whole, and since we hold that both causation and freedom are possible, and would cease to be contradictions in a completely known universe, a solution of the antinomy if offered.

## 2. Argument proper.

The desired reconciliation can only come, when we prove

- A. The validity of Final Causes.
- B. Establish the Sanction of Ethical Principles.
- A. Review of Final Causes to establish their validity.
  - a. Definition of Final Cause. Distinguished from

Material Cause Formal Cause Efficient Cause

- b. Only two methods of explaining the facts of the universe, either by efficient or final causation.
- c. Explanation by efficient causation.

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All explanations by efficient causation can be reduced to explanation by

- a. Mechanism,
- b. Instinct,
- c. Evolution.

All three are shown to be insufficient in themselves, at the most they only explain the mode of the action, not the cause. This compels us to seek another source for the facts of the cosmic world, and the only other process that is acceptable to rational thinking men is an explanation by intelligence, and the only one about which they can form any clear idea. This brings us to the subject of Final Causes.

- d. Explanation by Final Causation.
  - (1) Cannot be established apriori.

Futility of the teleological argument; if there are no ends in the universe, there are none for man any more than for nature.

- (2) It is an hypothesis, the truth of which rests on the number and the character of the phenomena observed.
- (3) It is necessitated by the fact that causality merely as an efficient cause, cannot explain the fact of organs, genera, or species, nor the rational nature of man.
- (4) Truth rests upon the following arguments:
  - (a) Argument from design.

Character of design.
Adaptation to the future.

(b) Confirmatory physical arguments.

- (c) Confirmatory moral arguments.
- (d) Argument from history.
- e. Finality if admitted, must be rightly understood to be one of intelligence. Uniform sequence of phenomena never explains the cause of the sequence. The cause must rest in something having being. This brings us to a theistic conception of the universe. It obliges us to posit as a world-ground, a being that is intelligent because designing; moral because likewise imposing moral dictates upon the reason. The finality must rest in a moral universe, and the lower steps are the ones by which nature rises to its terminus.
- B. Examination of Ethical Principles to find their sanction.
  - a. Existence of the law of duty.

It is not difficult to show that in the actual state of human consciousness that an elemental factor called duty exists.

b. Origin of the Law.

Three explanations are offered.

(a) An acquired idea born of civilization.

Argued: that there is no morality among savages; that the codes among civilized nations are contradictory.

Proved to be false since it fails to explain the necessity of its continued existence at the present

day. Moreover an historical argument does not impugn the validity of the idea as now held. The idea of a general form for the existing law claims control over the reason, and over the will.

- (b) It is the result of reason working upon some sort of intellectual data.
- (c) It is implanted in us by some causative power outside of ourselves.

These last two explanations point to a law giver, to whom we are personally responsible.

- c. Nature of the Law.
  - (a) Absolute. The same ideal or model of perfection is given to all men.
  - (b) Universal. Gives the same commands to all men under the same circumstances.
- d. Sanction of the Law.
  - (a) Lies in the soul. It is an ideal that is unfolded by slow stages of growth. The natural in man must be raised to the plain of the moral. The law derives its sanction, not because it is imposed from without, but because it appeals to the raason, and we inevitably desire it ourselves. The reason sanctions it because it accords with its nature.
  - (b) Part played by Human Freedom.

Its limitation and its scope.

It is limited by

- (1) External factors.
  Environment
- (2) Internal factors.

  Temperament ) inherited

  Nature ) from the

  Disposition ) past

These two factors constitute the sphere in which man works out his ideal.

C. Apparent conflict between ethical principles and Final Causes.

Source of the conflict.

Due to an effort to reconcile efficient causation with free will. If we retain the explanation of the world process by

Mechanism Instinct Evolution

no harmony can be attained.

Due to failure to reconcile the two on Humian, empirical, or psychological grounds. Fallacy of Kant's transcendental idealism snown because it substitutes new difficulties for the old. Reasons by which modern science contends against free will discussed and refuted.

- D. Reconciliation of Ethical principles and Final Causes.
  - a. Reconciliation can come only when freedom is rightly understood, and when finality does not mean predeterminism of the will.
  - b. To what extent the theory of final causes

determines and limits the nature of the individual.

Limits him in the sense that he is part of the cosmic process, and compelled to work out his destiny.

- c. Limitation of the meaning of freedom: it cannot mean freedom in any unconditioned sense of the word; it cannot mean chance, or caprice, or power to act without motive, or plan, or without calculation.
- d. The reconciliation can come only when we recognize that the will is determined in the sense that it has uniform antecedents. It is free, in the sense that it is not determined by anything outside of itself. Freedom is not exemption from law, it can be realized only where there is law and order. The fact that it is an ethical principle shows that it does not lie in the field of lawlessness.
- e. The solution depends then not only on man's relation to nature, but also on his relation to the infinite, -- both interpretations throw us back once more on the sssential and the ultimate nature of the man himself.

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- f. It is the union of the Universal Will with that of the individual that can bring about the desired harmony. It is this union that constitutes morality.
- g. This reconciliation is possible only where the theory of Final Causes has been accepted, and where freedom in the sense defined above is recognized.

## 3. Conclusion.

The reconciliation can take place only when we review the life of man in its totality. Our metaphysics must correct the idea of the libertarian who
makes freedom all, and the necessitarian who makes
automatism all. In a completely known universe, the
two facts are only the reverse and the obverse of the
two-faced fact of a rational self-development. Freedom is the only means by which man can work out his
destiny in a predestined world, of sentient beings.
In the joint action, in the life of every mind
directed by a freedom that recognizes an Ideal, and
is thus necessitated to realize it, we find the union.

· · · ·  To the student of Philosophy the problem is not new, but its interest is still vital, for all the charges brought by modern science against Philosophy, none have been more strange or prolific of fruitless controversy, than the attacks directed against human freedom.

The problem may be stated thus: Life as we know it presents two great orders of things, one the world of objective facts, the Cosmos, the other the world of subjective values, the moral world. In the cosmic world, which we interpret by scientific methods, we find that the law of causality reigns supreme. In the moral world, which we interpret by standards that we supply ourselves, we find that freedom of the will is the absolute condition and postulate, the criterion of all life that has any ethical value. Herein lies an apparent antinomy: either the law of causality is universal and without exception, in which case freedom of the will is a delusion, or in the moral world, the law suffers a notable exception.

The interests of science seem bound up with the denial of freedom in any and every sense of the word. Scientists claim that the admission means embarrassment to the scientific consciousness, and the surrender of the claim to finality in its view of human life.

( · · · · , , . t to the state of This attitude has led many philosophers to assert that we are lawlessly free, and able to initiate our actions without motive or cause. We are all familiar with the fable of the two knights that quarrelled about the self-same shield, because each of them saw one side of it alone. The disputants of determinism versus freedom are in much the same position, and most of the arguments set forth on either side can be reduced to a war of meaningless words of great sound and fury, signifying nothing. A general truth might be stated here, "all nature demands a broader and truer interpretation wherein every part shall have assigned to it its just significance, and unto the whole, adequate import be ascribed."

The source of the conflict is due to a misconception of the true implication of the terms causation and freedom, and to the narrowness of our metaphysics, or our interpretation of life as a whole. To the author, causality and freedom are both true, and in a completely known universe would cease to be contradictions, and since a thorough going system of philosophy demands the justification of both principles and their reconciliation, I venture once more to offer a solution to this already much debated question.

In all philosophical discussions, it is absolutely necessary, that all terms employed should be so defined that there can be no ambiguity in their interpretation. So much

depends in any reconciling project such as is here attempted in getting at the true meaning of causation, on
the one hand, and freedom on the other. Therefore considerable space must be devoted to a thorough review of
causation, to establish the validity of final causes, and
to an examination of ethical principles, to find their
sanction. Then, and only then, can we effect the desired
reconciliation.

The first point then in our discussion is to review briefly the proofs for finality in causation. In all systems of philosophy, the term cause has four meanings:

- 1. The material cause; the "raw stuff" so to speak, or contents, cut of which reality is formed.
- 2. The formal cause; the principle of discrimination and arrangement, by which the material is kept from being chaotic, and instead is rendered intelligible.
- 3. The kinetic or changing, or efficient cause; by which form is applied to matter, and one form is changed to another.
- 4. The final cause; the cause wherefore the intelligible and recognized aim under which all the first three operate.

The following example may make this distinction clearer. We wish to model a bust in clay. First of all there is the clay; obviously there can be no clay figure

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if there is no clay. This then is the material cause of the finished figure. But this same figure is as important a condition of the bust as the clay. The figure produced in the clay is called the formal cause. Just as necessary to the being of the effect is the artist who does the modelling, the active or efficient cause of the bust; and lastly there is his purpose. This end or purpose which prompted the efficient cause to act is known as the Final Cause.

To the philosopher, only the last two are of interest, since men try to explain the facts of the cosmos either by efficient or by final causation. All theories of efficient causation can be reduced to an explanation of the forces of nature by mechanism, instinct, or evolution.

The form of the argument has varied from age to age, but the almost uninterrupted aim of philosophy has been the discovery of efficient causes in nature. In early times, men saw the cause of all things in fire, or water, or air, or fortuitous impact, or combination of material atoms.

To them the sovereign shaping element was the only God.

Again, Comte's metaphysical era was characterized by the belief in efficient causes, and the attempt to discover and define them. Briefly, then, what are these theories and wherein do they fall short?

The mechanical theory announces that everything that

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is, or has happened, exists because something outside made it be so, or happen so, and that there is no such thing as self-activity. Whatever appears to be self-activity and the originations of new chains of causality is only, after all, a link in the great chain of correlation of forces which has no beginning and no ending. Science has taken for its problem the discovery of the simple mechanical elements that masquerade under the forms of life, the plant and animal, and under the widely variant and complex forms of human life. Mechanism explains away the second order of causality, which we find in all our experiences by thinking it into the forms of simple mechanism of dead elements, moved only by impact from outside. The difficulty lies in the fact that mechanism itself must be accounted for. As far as it suffices, we are all right; if it sufficed everywhere we should not need to seek another explanation. But, as Janet remarks, "however great a part be assigned to it, there always comes a moment when it runs aground and breaks down, were it only, for example, before the final causes in man. It is then, by way of regression, the territory in appearance abandoned, can be taken little by little, and we can ascend from psychological finality to physiological and organic finality." Coining of new terms explains nothing. Magnetism, electricity, the electron theory, are names

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for our ignorance, not for knowledge-fence-words set up at the outposts of the ground that has been surveyed, and designating unexplored regions beyond. We can never know absolutely the truth of a single law of the inductive sciences. "Because the physicists have persisted in talking about causation when, according to their own admission, they meant only invariable antecedence; and of force, power, and energy, when they meant only the motion, either actual or foreseen, they have been betrayed, in the expression of their doctrines into statements which are inconsistent with each other, illogical and even meaningless; when they attempt to dovetail these facts into systems and theories, to build a philosophy of nature upon them, to give us a new cosmogony, and a new conception of man, the universe and God -- or rather of man and the universe without a God-then they have gone beyond their proper functions, and their use of a Phraseology which does not belong to them, has betrayed them into countless inconsistencies and absurdities." The mechanical hypothesis fully carried out leads to a violation of all the laws of science, since it makes an absolute hiatus between the phenomena of nature and the intelligence of man; to a violation of all the laws of reasoning, by denying intelligence in any form; to a contradiction, because, it is forcibly arrested in the presence of a last case, the human intelligence, and consequently it is constrained, at


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least to admit finality, which suffices for its demonstration.

Instinct and evolution remain. Instinct of itself never explains. It is a mysterious faculty and calls for an explanation. Evolution to some extent as a scientific hypothesis is possible. But as it is popularly held, there is little, if anything, in the way of fact or experiment or experience to justify the enormous assumptions upon which it rests. Even in its most strictly scientific form, it leaves very much to be desired; nor does it rise above the dignity of being an hypothesis. In any case, granting the claim to the fullest extent, it is not sufficient in itself as an explanation. It may explain the mode of action not the cause. Applied to organized forms, evolution may have two meanings. Either it expresses the gradation of organic beings, rising by degrees from less to more perfect forms, which it must seek the cause outside of itself, or it is only a theory of fortuitous combinations under a more learned form. A single step in the series is not accounted for by referring it to the preceding step, however familiar the sequence may have been. Many people seem to imagine that, if the successive steps are very short ones, -- or placed very near each other, -a bridge is thereby formed on which we may pass without difficulty form one extreme to the other, either from the structureless germ up to the complex and perfect organism, or from the animalcule up to man. The whole theory

· · • · ( -1 .  of the evolutionists is founded upon this delusion. The difficulty lies in taking any step at all. Even if a chain of being were to be established from the lowest Monad up to the intellect of an archangel, the successive steps sliding into each other by imperceptible gradations, we should not diminish one whit, the necessity for seeking outside of the series for a First Cause of all things. Without the agency of mind which cannot be found in a chain of mere physical events, or self-acting machines, however near they may be to each other, the first step of evolution, the least movement of change, becomes impossible.

Thus Evolution does not give us, in the end, one reason more than any other mechanical system for the facts of the universe. It does not explain how from a primitive chaos a regular system should have emerged. Its ideal would be to reduce all to the laws of motion, but as we have seen neither motion or matter can explain anything. Matter seems to be enfolded in mystery. Motion is as mysterious in its nature. Watter endowed with motion presents innumerable problems to the scientist and the philosopher. Each and both together require an explanation of their possibility. In neither of these two elements is contained the principle of a rational development. We see then the absolute need of some other idea which will serve ive for direct cause, -- this then brings us to the doctrine of finality in nature.



The only other explanation that can be offered to explain the facts of the visible universe, and about which we can form a clear idea is by intelligence. Our process must be one of exclusion. In man, we recognize a mode of calculation superior to foresight, namely inspiration, not instinct, since instinct is routine, while inspiration is creative. The question remains, wherein is the explanation of the cosmic process more satisfactory, by intelligence? As Janet remarks so concisely, the principle of final causes is not a self-evident principle. We reach it only by induction, and accept it as it verifies the number and character of the observed phenomena. We find that the mechanism does not suffice to explain the facts or organisms, genera, and species. It is reached by the fact, that certain combinations with a final phenomena independent of them, would be a mere chance, and that nature cannot be explained altogether by accident. The relation of finality being once admitted as a law of the universe, the only rational hypothesis is that is is derived from an intelligent Cause. We must show the harmony and arrangement of nature, we must point out that there is an adaptation of the parts to the whole, and how even the laws and principles that direct the moral and intellectual judgment of man, demonstrate the existence of a designing cause directing all things to their proper ends.

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When we consider the universe as a whole we are struck by the harmony and balance manifested in it. The courses of the planets, and the laws of motion to which they are subjected act as if each had its purpose or end. Again in the vital operations of plants and animals we find a wonderful adaptation, a future purpose. The web of the spider, the structure of the hive, the nest of the swallow, show us not only is a very definite end to be attained, but also that animals, incapable of perceiving and understanding for themselves any finality in the universe, and unable to investigate, choose, or vary the means at their disposal, still work similarly towards the end planned for them, and instinctively play their part in the finality of the whole. If then we ask whence comes this disposition seen in the whole of nature, whence and why the observed laws, whence the plan upon which vegetable and animal structures are built up, and to what purpose each tends, regularly and systematically toward the production of its own proper effects? -- we must invariably answer that there is a final cause for all this arranging, ordering, disposing, and moving towards definite fixed and preestablished ends. Each particular fruit, in its form, color, fragrance, a definite outgrowth from the flower, the bud, the leaves, the stem and branches, the trunk and root of its tree, the entire development born of, and growing from, one tiny seed, itself produced from a parent plant. ---

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shows a far more wonderfully adapted purposiveness than the most intricate and artificial machine. Still more astounding is the finality manifested in the parts of animals and in their actions. Look where and when we will, design is written large upon every being in nature; and, with our knowledge of ourselves and the arbitrary nature of our intellectual and moral first principles, our theoretical truths that are seen immediately and necessarily, and the practical dictates of our reason when contemplating the performing or omitting of an action, we must perforce conclude that there is indeed a designer, intellecutal -because designing and imposing principles upon intellect; moral -- because of the moral dictates likewise designed and imposed; else we must confess to an utter chaos in the whole of nature, an utter incomprehensibility in all the conceptions of our minds.

Finality not being a subjective view of our mind, but a real law of nature, demands a real cause. That the finality cannot be mechanism which is destructive of all finality, nor that which is above mechanism, -- instinct or vitality, -- we have proved. The primary root then must be in soul -- that is intelligence or thought; for there is nothing beyond, at least intelligible to us, except, perhaps liberty. But liberty without intelligence and thought is only brute force. In considering not only man

( ( ( but every moral being in general, as the end of creation, we have a reason for being warranted to regard the world as a system of final causes. The world has its end to become the theatre, the instrument, the object of morality. In order to be appropriated to that end, it must originally be susceptible of finality, the lower degrees must be the steps whereby nature rises to its terminus. There must be a succession of relative ends, to render possible this absolute end. The end of nature is to realize in itself the absolute end as far as possible, or to render possible the realization of the absolute in the world. This is brought to pass by morality. "If there are no ends in the universe, there are none for man any more than for nature; there is no reason why the series of causes should be mechanical up to the appearance of man, and become teleological from man onwards. If mechanism reigns in nature it reigns everywhere, in ethics as well as in physics. No doubt there might still be subjective and contingent ends, but not unconditional and absolute, not truly moral ends. Morality is at once the accomplishment and the ultimate proof of the law of finality."

By every road, by every comparison, we are led to the identity of our conceptions. The necessary being, the first unmoved and immovable motor, the first efficient cause, the highest and pure perfection, the living - |=

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intellect, the ultimate author of all design and finality, are one and the same being.

There is no principle of reason, no scrap of reason, to contradict the belief in a Final Cause. Efficient causality can never adduce a direct argument against it. Hypothesis may take what form it please, an eternal and forsaken bathybios, or a thunderstorm, or a dead ancestor, or the forces of nature, but it is incapable of disproving the existence of a Final Cause. The plain English of such theories is this: -- "Anything you will, only no Creator. But if there be no Creator, all these theories involve self-causation. No germs, or planets, or Bathybios, can save them from absurdity. Bathybios is either created, self-created, or increate, that is eternal. Is it easier to believe an eternal Bathybios than an Eternal Creator? An eternal slime than an Eternal Intelligence?"

If we take the pains to look closely into our own minds, we are immediately struck with the deeply rooted sense of responsibility with regard to our own actions, which we find occupying so prominent a place there. And if, to go a step further, we attempt to concord the expression of this feeling of responsibility, or duty, as it issues in acts with the principle itself, if we seek to discover the relationship existing between its concrete application and its abstract nature, we shall find that it is neither the result of the education of a primitive instinct,

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nor an entirely irrational sentiment. Whatever may be the origin of this feeling of duty, we must admit that, in the actual consciousness of humanity or, at least in that of the noblest groups of humanity, there exists the idea of a general or universal form for our actions, of a law that claims control over the reason, and command over the will.

If we examine this sense of duty as it exists solely in ourselves as individuals, we shall see that it is nothing more than an aspect of our reason, a purely subjective feeling which we are conscious of possessing. It has its value, and its force for each individual, inasmuch, and just so far, as he personally apprehends it. But in some form or other, every human being is conscious of its possession. The universality of moral principles is not argued against when we say that there is no morality among savages, that among civilized nations we find contradictory codes, for the fact remains that a moral consciousness exists. Its effects in individual cases and among different nations may be quite different. The Greeks burned the bodies of their dead as the highest token of filial devotion. The Callatians, on the other hand, considered cremation to be in the highest degree wrong. either case, the feeling was equally strong. The "ought of the Callatians was similar to that of the Greeks. And hence, though each of us must apply to his actions the

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dictates of his own conscience, in precisely the same way that he must settle his intellectual problems for himself, in the fulness of his own knowledge, the moral principle, the "ought not" and the "ought", is common to all men. We share in common with all mankind the sentiment of obligation, duty, responsibility.

The question now remains, whence does this feeling come? There are three explanations offered, only two of which have any value. The first supposes it to be primarily an instinct akin to that of the brutes, educated and rendered permanent and imperative, by an indefinite series of actions performed either by the individual, or by his ancestors. Such actions the theory goes on to explain, have brought with them consequences of pain, or of pleasure: and the indefinite repetition of painful, or of pleasurable sensations, has at length caused the individual to look upon his actions as right or wrong in the precise proportion in which they have, in his own case or in that of a long line of forebears, been connected with consequences which he desires to avoid or attain. But the real difficulty, the explanation of its existence at the present day, and why human actions should be followed by sensations of pain or of pleasure, is still unanswered. Two other explanations remain. Either it is the result of reason working upon some sort of intellectual data, or else it is implanted in us by a causative power other than ourselves. The solu-- | | |

, · · .  tion of both these alternatives points unhesitatingly to the same original cause.

The very idea of duty, then points to something superior to the individual -- something that is fixed and defined, and not subject to change on the part of the individual. In the second place, the idea of duty appeals only to the will and reason of man, and unless we confess to an utter irrationality in human nature, this will and reason are fundamentally the same in all men. Thus the law of duty is universal in its appeal, and absolute in its command. It derives its basis from the fact that, "every being owes it to himself that he should attain the highest degree of excellence and of perfection of which his nature is capable." The element of perfection, or of excellence, varies of course with differing races in the scale of being, and the feeling is capable of development as man increases in knowledge, and sympathy, and love with his fellows, and thus comes to a more perfect realization of the true essence of humanity. But once his essence is realized, a man cannot wish to be anything but a true man, a complete man, and he is thus self-determined to seek it. The superior will so far as it imposes authority on the inferior will is called obligation. The sanction of the moral life lies in the soul. The reason commands the individual to obey the divine will, that manifests itself to

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man under the form of duty, and the reason commands, because the law is in conformity with the dictates of the soul. The natural in man must be raised to the moral. The mind realizes the validity of the law, the reason sanctions it, and the will is self-determined to obtain it. The act is a personal one, -- we are citizens of a moral world, not slaves, and as such are co-workers with God. We cannot overrate the importance of obligation as men have understood it, and it presupposes a responsibility and human freedom. A freedom that is implied in every conception of human life that rises above the lowest. "This belief is essential to, and implied in all human enjoyments which rise above those of the animals and the lowest savages, in all the refinements of civilization, of art, of literature, in all systems of law, in the achievements of conqueror and statesman, in the charm of polished society, in wit and humor and romance, in our very likes and dislikes, in our personal judgments of our fellows, in our passions, our friendships, and our affections."

Take away this belief, and what is the result? All the deeper, the more delicate, the more interesting elements in life would be annihilated. With the banishment of the elements of freedom, all zest or meaning would vanish from human intercourse. The instinct of social order and the instinct to satisfy appetite, -- these would survive, but

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the heart of life would be gone. Vice and virtue would suffer a similar degradation, and would forlornly meet each other on terms of stolid equality. The truth is, that nothing that human beings do or are has any real value for us, except on the latent supposition that it is possible for them to be, or to do, something else, and that thus what they do, or are, represents a vital act of personal and spontaneous will, instead of being merely the outcome of a long train of causes which lose themselves in the general evolution of the race. Apart from this element, feeling and action would lose nearly every quality for which men have hitherto valued them. Freedom then becomes the working basis of all life that is rational. It furnishes man with an elevating and sustaining conviction that the shaping of the grand outlines of his destiny lies in his own hands. The doctrine of free will, which is necessarily the reverse of the doctrine of moral responsibility is essential as a working hypothesis to all human civilization, to all the elements that are regarded as most valuable by bad men, and moderately good men, as well as by excellent men. The drama of existence would lose all zest without it.

Just as responsibility of action implies freedom of action, just as freedom implies responsibility, so does responsibility for action when associated with the moral sense and sentiment imply the existence of some percipient being, to whom as a critic and juage of our actions we are

responsible, and whose moral preferences being coincident with our own moral sentiments, give to the latter a permanent and objective value. Assumption of free will and moral responsibility reach God. The belief in free will provides us with a working hypothesis on which the mind can construct a reasonable, civilized life, and other beliefs do not. The belief always appears in synthesis. All actions are fundamentally good or bad only in reference to the free will from which they proceed. Noral good and moral evil are rooted in the will itself; so much so, that, without the free exercise of his will, we cannot and do not hold any individual responsible for his actions, nor in such a case do we ever, strictly speaking, say that he has committed a crime or a sin.

Our idea of freedom however, needs a thorough examination that its limitations may be clearly evident. Freedom must lie where responsibility lies, that is in a man's character. His character, however, is determined by both internal and external factors. The internal factors are the temperament, the nature and the disposition which he has inherited from the past. The external factors are due to the environment in which he finds himself placed. These constitute for him the sphere in which he is to work out the alternative and the choice between good and evil. This sphere must differ for each individual since no two men are

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ever placed in the exact same circumstances, or subject to the same desires, or passions, yet in the view of the universe as a whole, unless our nature is utterly irrational and contradictory, each individual in working out his destiny must be self-necessitated to make that destiny coincide with the whole. In other words, our desires as well as our deeds are subject to the dictates of our conscious reason. And when we become conscious of an ideal aim in the universe, we are no longer free to disobey the command to realize it. "Duty", says Kant, "is the necessity of obedience to the law from respect to the law", and our liberty consists in the fact that we learn to follow with judgment, choosing the way and the means of secrificing our lower nature to the higher. Our liberty comes from the strength which we are capable of exerting in resisting anything that will lead us farther from what we have conceived as the true ideal. The strength of our liberty varies as we have seen with each individual; there are degrees of liberty; it is not absolute and final, and our liberty like our responsibility is obligatory for us, only in so far as we know and realize it. The will which desires the true good in life must always command the will which desires the apparent good; and our sin lies in a time world in failing to avail ourselves of the higher dictates of the reason. Liberty is not the actual possession of reason, but it is the capacity of acting in accordance with reason. As Janet remarks,

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"it is useless to adopt metaphysical hyperbole, claiming for ourselves an absolute liberty which unmanageable for us. Liberty exists for us in a real world, and as such it is the power of emancipating ourselves from the control of our inclinations, thanks to the light of reason, and by the aid of feeling."

We realize that in all the operations of the universe there is observable a certain definite order or regularity. No event stands by itself; each has its necessary antecedent and its inevitable consequences. And this conception of regularity, at first perceived in its most obvious manifestations, has gradually extended to all the operations of nature, including even those in which man has become a part. It has come to be clearly recognized that man cannot be regarded as standing alone, or outside the ordinary laws of nature. He exists as part of the universe and only as a part of it, and can no more act independently of it than any wheel in a machine can act independently of the movement of the machine as a whole. Every thought and every action of which he is capable has its necessary antecedents to the world around him. This conception once grasped, free will would seem at first almost too absurd to discuss. Man will always act according to the greatest pressure put upon him; if it is a number of forces he will go in the way of the resultant. Taking this standpoint from the operations around him, the

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scientist proceeds therefrom to build up a complete scheme for the universe, including even man humself. The libertarian has been right in the insistence, however, that there is a distinctive characteristic of human conduct as compared with the mechanism of brute life. He has been right in his conviction that conscious decision involves a new element not contained in the antecedents. He has usually been wrong in the conceptions by which he has tried to interpret these convictions.

Our task then, is to heal this apparent conflict between the natural and the moral world, or the deep seated antithesis between the interests of the scientific or intellectual consciousness on the one hand, and the moral and religious convictions of mankind on the other. That such a disagreement exists has been recognized and treated by different ages in various ways. As we pointed out in the beginning, the difficulty is largely due to the system of Netaphysics as a whole. The denial of freedom is the necessary corollary of a pantheistic system such as Spinoza's. Again, in a system of materialism alloyed with idealistic and evolutionary views, a theory of human volition is aeduced which gives the aeath blow to free will. The antecedent is in part the character of the agent, in part the motive rendering the action desirable. The character consists in dispositions and propensities intrinsic

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to the agent's organism, and is either inherited from ancestors or formed by past actions. The motives arise from the pleasurableness or the unpleasurableness of the action and its object, or from influence exercised by environment. Character and motives determine the will with and inevitable necessity.

Again, freedom cannot be vindicated in the empirical, Humian, or psychological account of the universe. Kant thought that he saw the solution of the problem in his theory of transcendental idealism. According to him, freedom lay outside the laws of the phenomenal world. The profundity and originality of his theory are incontestable, but the fact remains that it only eliminates the difficulties of other systems by substituting new ones, and that it leaves the problem in the same state in which it was found. Huxley tried to reach it indirectly, he at least saw the necessity of seeking a solution. "The development of science meant the extension of the principle of causation and the consequent banishment from our kinds of the very idea of free will. He admitted that had we really to accept the dominion of causation as universal -- that there would be no escape for us from an utter materialism and necessarianism which would drown the soul, paralize the energies, debase the moral nature, and destroy the beauty of life."

The main grounds upon which modern science contends against free will are based first, on a subjective psychology, or study of the mind's action as revealed to us by conscious experience; and from an objective study of the human or physical organism. They claim that every act of the will has its condition in the brain, therefore the mental must follow the same laws that prevail throughout the whole physical universe. As regards organism, since it is determined by parentage, health, climate, and similar circumstances, and since organism determines the character and the will of the individual, it is merely a multitude of external causes that determine the will. The point to remember here is that there is a well marked limit to all psychological explanations. "The life of man, which is in its essence a personal life is regarded by psychology as an impersonal stream of thought, a series of phenomenal facts, a series of the mental states of consciousness." But metaphysics must correct the abstractness of all psychology, and review the moral life from its personal centre, from that standpoint of the selfhood, which, as a unifying principle is not to be phenomenalised because without its constant operation there would be no phenomenal process at all; which cannot itself be accounted for, or explained by psychology, because it is presupposed in any ethical view of life, any personal view.

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Since, however we have rejected all systems of causation based upon materialism, evolution, or instinct, we have no need here to reconcile these theories with freedom. We grant that the harmony cannot be attained unless we accept the theory of final causes, and freedom as defined above. Then, and only then, can we effect the desired harmony that follows easily and naturally from their genuine ideas; and show that this harmony is involved in their necessary and complementary relation to each other, and that finally, out of the joint action, there arises a universe evermore freely moving to a higher and higher union with God.


Any settlement of the question must recognize as true the points which follow:

- The reconciliation can come only when freedom is rightly understood. It cannot mean freedom in any unconditional sense, existing so to speak in vacuo. It cannot mean caprice, or chance, or power to act without influence, or plan, or purpose, or without calculation. A freedom that is simply a "first cause", an underived, unreasonable power is meaningless.
- 2. No reconciliation is possible if the terms are so juggled that they lose their original meaning yet retain their names, as when we say that freedom means spontaneity, instead of choice or alternative.

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
- 3- No reconciliation can be reached if we take finality in the world-ground to mean Predestination of the will.
- 4. The reconciliation can come only when we recognize that the will is determined, in the sense that it has uniform antecedents; that it is free, in the sense that it is not determined by anything outside of itself. Freedom is not exemption from law: it can be realized only where there is law and order. The fact that it is an ethical principle shows us that it does not lie in the fields of lawlessness.
- 5. The solution depends, then, not only on man's relation to nature, but also on his relation to the infinite, -- both interpretations throw us back once more on the essential and the ultimate nature of man himself. It is the union of the universal Will with that of the individual that can bring about the desired harmony, and it is this union that constitutes morality.

We see the law of nature working as it were first blindly and mechanically, through the medium of dead matter; then, less blindly and mechanically, but none the less surely, through animate matter; and finally and consciously and indirectly, but none the less surely, through the medium of intelligence. Each individual has within himself the power of determining the force of the various pressures brought to bear upon him, so conditioning their control. The laws of the



universe work, in the case of man, through free will, as the medium through which they alone can work in a sentient world. Freedom is man, then, is simply the mode which has been given to him to aid in the finality of the whole. This natural world is a scene of ceaseless conflict between its immediate or present form and the eternal or ideal form of the spirit. The universe is gradually working out its destiny. Instinct, evolution, free will, merely explain the process by which various orders in the scale of being work. But the imperative and constraining definiteness of physical fate implies somewhere an ultimate Defining source, itself therefore free from which the constraining edict issues. This source, as free and yet defining, must be selfdefined, must be Itself. The only hypothesis that explains the totality of phenomena, which grasps the harmony between the moral and the physical worlds, is that there is an Absolute First Cause, that is unconditioned by anything outside itself.

We recognize that freedom is not a question of yes and no, but rather of how far and how much. To say that there is no control of nature by science, is palpably absurd; to say that all progress is due to natural selection of accidental variations, is becoming less and less plausible, with the conscious organization of industrial, social and political agencies. There is an automatic, as well as a




voluntary, element in human activity; and it is as impossible to exclude the former as it is to deny the latter. The one-sidedness of the libertarian, who makes freedom all, is opposed by the one-sidedness of the necessitarian, who makes automatism all. Even the claim that motives are reasons, not causal and dynamic, cannot be allowed, for while motives as conceptions are not dynamic, motives as arising from or expressing impulses, consitutional or otherwise, do exercise an influence upon volition and may even defy our attempts to control them. There are fixed laws within, as without the agent, and our conquest of the mental realms like that of the physical realms, depends upon obedience to the laws which we find, and which we can neither found nor abrogate.

The plain and unmistakable sense possessed by all of us of our own moral responsibility, of the imputability of our own acts to ourselves, is a sense which rests on the unexpugnable conviction that we are ourselves the authors of those acts. Its essential connection is not with his actions, but with his character: and it is in reality, for his character, and not for his actions, that his consciousness assures him that he is responsible, and since it is only from this ingrained sense of responsibility that we are able to infer the existence of moral liberty at all, this liberty must reside where responsibility resides,—that is, in a man's character.


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Man never acts otherwise than as he wills to act, and yet at the same time his actions are always necessary. The reason is that he already is what he wills, and the fact that his acts, under the influence of given motives or cir cumstances, follow with absolute necessity from what he is and wills, merely proves that his actions are the unerring expression of his individual essence. There is no denial here of liberty, it is elevated. The will acts with regularity and uniformity. It is determined, in the sense that it has uniform antecedents. It is free, in the fact that it is not constrained by anything outside of itself. Freedom is not exemption from law. Mind becomes moral because it is held responsible. It is limited on the one hand, by our physical constitution, and on the other, by the intensity of the impulses and the desires it has to control. Freedom may choose the seed, it can neither determine nor escape the harvest. So far from freedom being indeterminism, chance or caprice, these are seen to be incompatible with it, and freedom proves to be, like finality, the spontaneous definiteness of active intelligence. And one thing of the highest importance, which we must not overlook, is our discovery that no being can be the product of processes in Nature, and, on the other hand, no one can exert freedom in an unpredestined world, and that consequently every free being in relation with such a world must himself predestine



it, must impart arrangement, or form to it, from the form of his own active intelligence. In fine, a condition for our making liberty possible in a world ordered by the reign of natural law is that we accept an idealistic philosophy of Mature; the laws of nature must issue from the free actor himself, and upon a world consisting of states of consciousness, a world in so far of his own making.

The universe is gradually working out its destiny, and if "working out" would imply complete freedom then complete freedom would imply determinism. A universe possessing freedom throughout would differ in no wise in its workings from our present universe, except that it would be completely conscious. Responsibility has been placed on us in whom the power and self-consciousness have attained the highest development of freedom. The central problem of morality is seen to be, like the central problem of knowledge, the nature and function of the self. If a resolution of the self into its successive states is impossible, if moral experience presupposes at each stage the presence and the operation of a permanent self, the case of freedom is made good. The secret of the power of the moral ideal is the conviction that it carries with it that it is no mere ideal, but the expression, more or less perfect, and always becoming more perfect, of the supreme Reality that "the rule of right, the symmetries of



character; the requirements of perfection, are no provincialisms of this planet: they are known among the stars, they
reign beyond the Southern Cross, they are wherever the Universal
Spirit is. This affirmation of the reality of the moral life
must give us in the end a higher view of God, as well as enable us to conceive the possibility of a higher union with
Him. The union and communion not only of thought with thought,
but of will with Will."

Here at length, we are able to unite freedom and determinism in the life of every spirit. It consists in the fact that both determinism and freedom mean the self-determination of the conscious being in the light of a two-fold ideal, the ethical knowledge of a Supreme Ideal, and the knowledge of himself as a thoroughly individual being, differentiated from the Supreme Cause, yet related to it, in the great total of his existence, moving in response to his contemplations of it, and therefore freely moving. In this union of the actual and the ideal, we find an explanation of right and wrong. The question of our effectual freedom in the world of experience is simply a question whether we have not a living source of right within us, our own eternal choice. "We cannot annihilate the potential for goodness that lies in our eternal vision of the supreme Ideal."

Freedom and determinism are only the obverse and the reverse of the two-faced fact of rational self-development.

Freedom is the thought-action of the self, defining its identity


-• ·  and determinism means nothing but the definite character which the rational action involves. This freedom far from disjoining, and isolating each self from other selves, in fact, defines the inner life of each, in its determining whole, in harmony with theirs. And in this real freedom which is inherently rational there is that determinism, that definiteness, which issues from guidance by the universal rational aim: -- this very determinism gives rise to that ever-recurring Alternative, that chance, which is so often mistaken for the whole of freedom, but is only a derivative part of it.

Each spirit other than God fulfils in his own way, and from its own self-direction, the one universal type or Ideal. Then each, in doing its own will, that is, in guiding and defining its own life by its ideal, does the ultimate and inclusive will of all the rest; and men realize the will of God, that is, fulfil the ideal of the universe, by fulfilling each his own ideal. The demand for a moral world is the demand for a world of freedom: a world of persons that think their own thoughts, originate their own decisions, and decide rationally,-- yet with judgment,-- that is at once private, yet public. Potency for such judgment, and the power to make it real under the most trying conditions, is what moral freedom means. The power to do, as well as to choose.

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In a final cause, then, we are to look for the release from the controversy about the determinism in divine supremacy, and the self-determinism in human or other non-divine freedom. The reconciliation lies in realizing that the universe of which we have a kind of knowledge is but a portion or an aspect of the whole. We are free, and we are controlled. We are free in so far as our sensible surroundings, and immediate environment are concerned: that is, we are free for all practical purposes, and can choose between alternatives, as they present themselves. We are controlled, as being intrinsic parts of an entire Cosmos, suffised with law and order. The more developed and consistent and harmonious our character becomes, the less liable it is to random outbreaks, and the more certainly can it be relid on. We, thus, even now, can exhibit some approximation to the highest etate, that conscious union with the entire scheme of existence, which is identical with perfect freedom.

In the last analysis, all scientific views of the universe end in conceptions that the intellect is equally unable to grasp. Human knowledge must always be limited. Nevertheless, our limitations should not afford a reason for doubting that the external universe exists. If we could see all in its totality, we should find that everything was definite and ordered and linked



up with everything else in the chain of causation, and that nothing was capricious, or uncertain, or uncontrolled. In believing that freedom and God exist in the cosmic world, though that world, at first, reveals no direct trace of them, we are doing no more violence to reason than when we assert that this cosmic world is real, that it exists outside ourselves, and that science, within limits, is its true interpreter. The existence of nothing in its totality can be grasped by the intellect; hence the actual working of the process, the nature of the links, the causes that create our determinations, are frequently unknown. We still believe, however, that between our lives and the Supreme cause of the universe a personal relationship exists, in virtue of which human affairs are vested with an importance and a meaning imperceptible to the eye of the ordinary observer, that, in the joint action in the life of every mind directed by a freedom that recognizes an Ideal, and is self-determined to realize it, is born the inspiring realization of a universe ever more freely moving to a higher and higher harmony with God.

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